The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has, throughout history, been a theatre of intense endeavour, enterprise, competition and friction. The IOR has long been a pivot in global power equations, whose domination, or control, has guaranteed prosperity, and even mastery, of the greater global commons. With the two fastest growing economies namely India and China with their global hunt for energy and the ever growing importance of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) via the volatile Strait of Hormuz and narrow Malacca Strait has made this ocean as the global cockpit of great power rivalries vying for their pie in this resource rich ocean.
The sheer imperative of geo-economics over the erstwhile geo-politics and the shift of balance of power from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific ( earlier referred to as Asia-Pacific by the western world) and the strategic location of the Indian Ocean has made, as the noted US strategic thinker Robert D Kaplan opined in his work “Monsoon” as the “centre stage for the 21st century” revisiting the Mahanian terminology of the importance of sea power in the coming future in which the “new great power game” in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) is slowly but steadily being unfolding.
The Indo-Pacific region is an area of both relative insecurity and strategic instability. It contains some significant flashpoints and has its fair share of border issues, acts of terrorism and overlapping maritime claims. The Pacific part of the Indo-Pacific region possesses significant multilateral structures like the APEC and the ASEAN. Most regional institutions revolve around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including the East Asian Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the various ‘ASEAN Plus’ groupings. The membership of the EAS includes India, but the various ASEAN-hubbed institutions have focused mainly on East Asia, while the Indian Ocean Region (IOR ) has received less attention. Southeast Asia is often regarded as a distinctively maritime sub-region as maritime bridge between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. In many ways, it is the geographical centre of gravity for the wider Indo-Pacific region.
Increasingly, it makes sense to conceive of a wider Indo-Pacific region rather than the traditional conception of Asia-Pacific and its various sub-regions. Economic connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region depends largely on maritime links, for trade and energy supplies needed to propel future growth. The IOR in many ways is the geographical centre of gravity for the wider Indo-Pacific region. Sitting astride significant choke points or straits between the Indian and Pacific oceans, Southeast Asia also fringes the South China Sea, and is, thus, economically and strategically vital to the emerging economies of Asia. With widespread concern for the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) across the IOR and Southeast Asia, there is no doubt that there will be renewed interest of extra-regional countries in the IOR.
The importance of maritime security has been highlighted by the recent establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Inter-Sessional Meetings on Maritime Security. Established in 1967, ASEAN has proven to be a very successful regional association. It has much to offer the IOR and its sub-regions as the larger region moves to a new era of development and regional institution-building. It could play a useful role in dampening down some of the instability that is emerging in the IOR.
In the spirit of the concept of an Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN should be more active in pursuing its common interests and links with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), in helping it to provide greater strategic certainty within that region. ASEAN should promote regional institution building by supporting moves to rejuvenate the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), BIMSTEC and others so that it focuses on a wider range of regional issues, including energy security as the region is infested with multifaceted security risks ranging from maritime piracy to arms smuggling and others by both State and non-State actors sponsored terrorism. ASEAN with its security forums like ARF, ASEANPOL and others should support cooperative measures for shipping security by strengthening the role of the Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy in Asia (ReCAAP) in the IOR pivotal for guaranteed energy security for fueling speedy growth of the ASEAN’s economies.
With a view towards enhancing the provision of speedy, responsive, and effective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations across the IOR, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) might give some attention to the these requirements in the IOR outside of its immediate interests in the ASEAN region. Learning from the devastating Tsunami of 2004-05, a study should be initiated by ASEAN of the maritime capacity needs of the less well-off countries of the IOR and of the potential for ASEAN to provide assistance, including training and human resource development, to the less well-off countries of the IOR in areas such as port development and management, coastal zone management, EEZ management and mitigating the effects of maritime natural disasters.
The IOR, home to about 2 billion humanity has 51 littoral, both coastal and landlocked countries serves as the global energy interstate with nearly 50 percent of the world’s container traffic and 70 percent of the world’s petroleum product travel through these waters in a complex globalized interdependent world and therefore being projected as the most highly contested global commons amongst the great powers in the coming new scramble for the IOR, sooner rather than later.
Therefore, ASEAN as an institution and as a potential security stabilizer in the region and its members, cannot afford to ignore these trends and should pay increased attention to promoting links with all the important countries of the IOR, especially with an “emerged great power” like India. This has become more as a security imperative before the ASEAN rather than as mere pick or drop policy choices with the rapid rise of the Communist China’s naval inroads in the region via its “string of pearls” geo-strategy with its “historical” claims to “own” the entire South China Sea fraught with protracted maritime disputes together with the benignly viewed rise of a Democratic India’s naval prowess. Because this resource rich but highly volatile region will going to shape Asia’s strategic destiny in the 21st century, to be driven solely by the sheer power of geo-economics, as foretold by Mahan or Panikkar in the past or retold by Robert D Kaplan or C Raja Mohan at present. Is the ASEAN ready for this coming “new great power game” in the IOR and in its backyard in the South China Sea?
The sheer imperative of geo-economics over the erstwhile geo-politics and the shift of balance of power from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific ( earlier referred to as Asia-Pacific by the western world) and the strategic location of the Indian Ocean has made, as the noted US strategic thinker Robert D Kaplan opined in his work “Monsoon” as the “centre stage for the 21st century” revisiting the Mahanian terminology of the importance of sea power in the coming future in which the “new great power game” in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) is slowly but steadily being unfolding.
The Indo-Pacific region is an area of both relative insecurity and strategic instability. It contains some significant flashpoints and has its fair share of border issues, acts of terrorism and overlapping maritime claims. The Pacific part of the Indo-Pacific region possesses significant multilateral structures like the APEC and the ASEAN. Most regional institutions revolve around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including the East Asian Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the various ‘ASEAN Plus’ groupings. The membership of the EAS includes India, but the various ASEAN-hubbed institutions have focused mainly on East Asia, while the Indian Ocean Region (IOR ) has received less attention. Southeast Asia is often regarded as a distinctively maritime sub-region as maritime bridge between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. In many ways, it is the geographical centre of gravity for the wider Indo-Pacific region.
Increasingly, it makes sense to conceive of a wider Indo-Pacific region rather than the traditional conception of Asia-Pacific and its various sub-regions. Economic connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region depends largely on maritime links, for trade and energy supplies needed to propel future growth. The IOR in many ways is the geographical centre of gravity for the wider Indo-Pacific region. Sitting astride significant choke points or straits between the Indian and Pacific oceans, Southeast Asia also fringes the South China Sea, and is, thus, economically and strategically vital to the emerging economies of Asia. With widespread concern for the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) across the IOR and Southeast Asia, there is no doubt that there will be renewed interest of extra-regional countries in the IOR.
The importance of maritime security has been highlighted by the recent establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Inter-Sessional Meetings on Maritime Security. Established in 1967, ASEAN has proven to be a very successful regional association. It has much to offer the IOR and its sub-regions as the larger region moves to a new era of development and regional institution-building. It could play a useful role in dampening down some of the instability that is emerging in the IOR.
In the spirit of the concept of an Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN should be more active in pursuing its common interests and links with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), in helping it to provide greater strategic certainty within that region. ASEAN should promote regional institution building by supporting moves to rejuvenate the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), BIMSTEC and others so that it focuses on a wider range of regional issues, including energy security as the region is infested with multifaceted security risks ranging from maritime piracy to arms smuggling and others by both State and non-State actors sponsored terrorism. ASEAN with its security forums like ARF, ASEANPOL and others should support cooperative measures for shipping security by strengthening the role of the Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy in Asia (ReCAAP) in the IOR pivotal for guaranteed energy security for fueling speedy growth of the ASEAN’s economies.
With a view towards enhancing the provision of speedy, responsive, and effective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations across the IOR, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) might give some attention to the these requirements in the IOR outside of its immediate interests in the ASEAN region. Learning from the devastating Tsunami of 2004-05, a study should be initiated by ASEAN of the maritime capacity needs of the less well-off countries of the IOR and of the potential for ASEAN to provide assistance, including training and human resource development, to the less well-off countries of the IOR in areas such as port development and management, coastal zone management, EEZ management and mitigating the effects of maritime natural disasters.
The IOR, home to about 2 billion humanity has 51 littoral, both coastal and landlocked countries serves as the global energy interstate with nearly 50 percent of the world’s container traffic and 70 percent of the world’s petroleum product travel through these waters in a complex globalized interdependent world and therefore being projected as the most highly contested global commons amongst the great powers in the coming new scramble for the IOR, sooner rather than later.
Therefore, ASEAN as an institution and as a potential security stabilizer in the region and its members, cannot afford to ignore these trends and should pay increased attention to promoting links with all the important countries of the IOR, especially with an “emerged great power” like India. This has become more as a security imperative before the ASEAN rather than as mere pick or drop policy choices with the rapid rise of the Communist China’s naval inroads in the region via its “string of pearls” geo-strategy with its “historical” claims to “own” the entire South China Sea fraught with protracted maritime disputes together with the benignly viewed rise of a Democratic India’s naval prowess. Because this resource rich but highly volatile region will going to shape Asia’s strategic destiny in the 21st century, to be driven solely by the sheer power of geo-economics, as foretold by Mahan or Panikkar in the past or retold by Robert D Kaplan or C Raja Mohan at present. Is the ASEAN ready for this coming “new great power game” in the IOR and in its backyard in the South China Sea?
Written by Sourabh Jyoti Sharma >>
![](http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-jcAAxQ4ElbE/WKwcndcl-hI/AAAAAAAAE9o/yMWtSJ5bxsUlIIXW3-12-6CGfTDrPIlVwCK4B/s1600/write%2Bget%2Bpublished%2Bsmall.png")
